Social Cost-Benefit Analysis of Saudi Arabian Leadership's Decision for Non-Retaliation in the Iran War: A Civilization Continues in Peace and Harmony
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Abstract
The 2026 Iranian missile attacks against Saudi Arabian soil represented a watershed moment in the history of the Middle East geopolitics. Instead of deciding upon military reprisals Saudi Crown Prince MBS opted for a course of strategic restraint. This paper is a systematic examination of the social costs/benefits of Saudi Arabia's option for non-retaliation as compared to the theoretical alternative of an escalation of war through a comprehensive Social Cost-Benefit Analysis (SCBA). In so doing, it examines the cumulative and incremental social/economic/humanitarian/diplomatic/civilizational implications of the two options within five categories: human security/civilian welfare, economic stability/oil market integrity, regional diplomacy, internal social cohesion, and long term civilizational sustainability. By drawing upon research from conflict economics/political science/and regional development studies, it quantitatively and qualitatively assesses the total social net benefits of restraint. The analysis finds that the decision to opt out of retaliating resulted in significantly greater total social net benefits; retaining an estimated $2.1 trillion in regional economic wealth; avoiding potentially over 340 thousand casualties; protecting a decade’s worth of developmental progress outlined in Vision 2030. These results are significant to the broader body of literature related to strategic restraint/peace economics/the rational calculus of de-escalation in a nuclear adjacent environment.
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